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A considerable proportion of financial decisions are made by agents acting on behalf of 
other people. Although people are more cautious for others when making medical decisions, 
this does not seem to be the case for economic decisions. However, studies with large amounts 
of money are particularly absent from the literature, which precludes a clear comparison to 
studies in the medical domain. To address this gap, we investigated the effect of outcome 
magnitude in two experiments where participants made choices between safe and risky options. 
Decision-makers were not more cautious for others over large amounts. In fact, risk-taking was 
accentuated for large amounts in the gain domain. We did not find self-other differences in the 
loss domain for either outcome magnitude. This suggests that the caution observed in medical 
decisions does not replicate in financial decisions with large amounts, or at least not in the 
same way. These results echo the concerns that have been raised about excessive risk-taking 
by financial agents.  
 










We are often required to make decisions on behalf of someone else, where the recipient 
of the decision bears the consequences of its outcome. These surrogate decisions can affect a 
wide range of people (relatives, patients, employees, consumers etc.) and are particularly 
common in the financial sector. One of the reasons why understanding financial surrogate 
decisions is so important is their implication in the financial crisis of 2007-2008. It is generally 
accepted that excessive risk-taking by people acting on behalf of investors was a causal factor 
in the crisis (Andersson, Holm, Tyran, & Wengström, 2013; Eriksen, Kvaløy, & Luzuriaga, 
2017; Füllbrunn & Luhan, 2015). This might not have happened if investors were managing 
their own money. Although many studies have looked at self-other differences in risky 
decision-making, almost all have focused on relatively small amounts of money, far from the 
magnitudes that were at stake in the financial crisis. This paper contributes to closing that gap. 
Various theoretical accounts of surrogate decision-making expect the significance of the 
decision to matter. It has been conjectured that being responsible for somebody else’s welfare 
pushes decision-makers to be more cautious than when deciding for themselves (Charness & 
Jackson, 2009). Responsibility is expected to increase with the significance of the decision, 
which means that decision-makers should reduce their risk-taking for others as the significance 
increases – the cautious shift account (Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2010; Füllbrunn & Luhan, 2015; 
Reynolds, 2009). Indeed, there is evidence that risk-taking for others is reduced when the 
decision-maker feels responsible or is held accountable (Montinari & Rancan, 2013; Pahlke, 
Strasser, & Vieider, 2012; Pollmann, Potters, & Trautmann, 2014).  
This is also supported by findings in the medical domain, where people accept less risk 
for others (Batteux, Ferguson, & Tunney, 2019a; Polman & Wu, 2020). These show that, for 
others, people are more likely to choose a treatment to avoid a painful or deadly illness 
(Batteux, Ferguson, & Tunney, 2019c; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012), while also more 
likely to refuse a treatment involving a risk of death (Batteux, Ferguson, & Tunney, 2019b). 
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On the whole, it seems that people are motivated by avoiding a risk of death to a greater extent 
for others (Von Gunten & Scherer, 2018), even at the expense of their quality of life (Batteux 
et al., 2019c). Most of these decisions could be considered mixed gambles, where choices 
involve both the possibility of a gain (e.g. recovering) and a loss (e.g. dying). For choices which 
can be interpreted as more of a gain (e.g. vaccination), people still seem to be more risk-averse 
for others (Dore, Stone, & Buchanan, 2014; Zikmund-Fisher, Sarr, Fagerlin, & Ubel, 2006), 
albeit perhaps to a lesser extent than when losses are more salient (Batteux et al., 2019a). 
Crucially, studies in the medical domain often focus on highly significant decisions, 
where people’s lives might be at risk. When outcomes are small, the difference disappears 
(Batteux et al., 2019b). This is consistent with Tunney and Ziegler’s (2015) model of surrogate 
decision-making, which assumes surrogates engage in perspective-taking that varies according 
to the particular features of the decision. Significant decisions would lead surrogates to take a 
benevolent perspective (i.e. what is best for the recipient). More trivial decisions would lead 
surrogates to put less effort into the decision and adopt a projected perspective (i.e. what they 
would do for themselves). Therefore, self-other differences would be the result of other factors 
than the perspective taken by the surrogate, such as the decision-maker’s reaction to the risk. 
This seems to be the case in the financial domain, where studies have largely focused on 
small amounts. Although there have been discrepancies in findings, a recent meta-analysis 
found that whether the decision involved gain or losses can partially explain this (Batteux et 
al., 2019a). When people have to choose between a sure option and a risky option, they tend to 
choose the risky option more for others over gains, but less over losses (Sun, Liu, Zhang, & 
Lu, 2016; Zhang, Liu, Chen, Shang, & Liu, 2017; Ziegler & Tunney, 2015). On the other hand, 
when choices involve mixed prospects, such as investments where there is the possibility of a 
gain or a loss, studies generally do not find self-other differences (Batteux et al., 2019a). 
Findings over losses in the financial domain are similar to findings in the medical domain, 
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which often involve large losses but also the possibility of gains. Whether decisions are made 
over gains, losses or both does not seem to neatly explain differences in findings between the 
medical and financial domain. 
Findings in the financial domain seem to support the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, which 
depicts risk preferences as the result of emotional reactions to the risk rather than a purely 
cognitive evaluation of the risk (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001). In the case of 
surrogate decisions, the decision-maker is distanced from the outcome – they do not experience 
the outcome of the decision and are therefore not directly affected by it, unlike the person they 
decide for. This creates what can be termed an empathy gap between the decision-maker and 
the outcome of the decision (Loewenstein, 1996). An empathy gap can for instance lead 
medical professionals to undertreat patients as they underestimate the extent of their pain, given 
they are not the one experiencing it (Loewenstein, 2005). As a result of this empathy gap, the 
decision-maker underweighs the emotional factors experienced by the recipient. Following this 
logic in the case of risky decisions, the emotional reactions to the risk that the decision-maker 
experiences would be attenuated when making decisions for others compared to themselves. 
As a result, their risk preferences would be more risk neutral for others. Indeed, when choosing 
between sure and risky options, people who are risk-averse for themselves are less so for others, 
whereas those who are risk-seeking are less so for others (Batteux, Ferguson, & Tunney, 2017; 
Eriksen, Kvaløy, & Luzuriaga, 2014). Similarly, because decision-makers tend to be risk-
averse for gains they should take more risk for others, and vice versa for losses (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). 
What about financial decisions with large amounts? The only study, to our knowledge, 
that looked at large magnitudes did not find differences in decisions but did find that people 
advise others to take less risk in a job scenario (Eriksen et al., 2017). This lends support to the 
cautious shift account. Although surrogate decisions in the medical domain are more cautious 
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than in the financial domain (Batteux et al., 2019a), this could be because financial decisions 
of high significance have not been investigated much. It makes sense that surrogate decision-
makers are more cautious in consequential medical decisions than inconsequential financial 
decisions, which would not elicit the same feeling of responsibility. 
In light of this, we hypothesise that surrogate decisions tend toward risk neutrality for 
others, but that when a substantial amount of responsibility is placed on the decision-maker, a 
cautious shift is observed. This cautious shift should counteract the tendency towards risk 
neutrality and lead to a reduction in risk-taking. For losses, where risk-taking should decrease 
for others for small outcomes, self-other differences would be accentuated for more significant 
decisions. For gains, where risk-taking should increase for others for small outcomes, this 
should mean that self-other differences are either reduced, disappear, or reverse. There is 
evidence of this with relationship decisions, which can be considered as gains with a potential 
loss. For decisions of low significance, decision-makers take more risk for others, but there are 
no self-other differences for high significance (Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, & Allgaier, 2003; 
Stone & Allgaier, 2008). It seems that this was due to reductions in risk-taking for others in 
decisions of high significance, which is in line with the caution hypothesis.  
We conducted two experiments where participants made choices between risky and safe 
options. To test whether surrogate decisions are comparable across outcome magnitudes, one 
group made choices about small outcomes and another about large outcomes. We included 
decisions over gains and others over losses to further examine the risk-as-feelings hypothesis. 
In Experiment 1, we did not use performance contingent payments to avoid converting large 
outcomes into small payments. We conducted a conceptual replication of this in Experiment 2 






Design. A 2 (Recipient) x 2 (Domain) x 2 (Magnitude) mixed design was used. Recipient 
(self, other) and domain (gain, loss) were within-subject factors. Magnitude (small, large) was 
a between-subjects factor. The dependent variable was the percentage of risky choices. 
Participants. Participants (n=120) were recruited online via Prolific1. The age group 
ranged from 18 to 36 (M=26.86, SD=4.41). There were 45 males and 74 females with varying 
levels of education. All participants resided in the United Kingdom to ensure that the currency 
used (£) in the task was relevant to all. Ethics approval was obtained from the ethics committee 
at the University of Nottingham, reference S1088. 
Choice task. The task involved making a series of choices between a guaranteed win or 
loss and a chance of winning or losing an amount of money. One series of choices was framed 
as a win and the other as a loss. Participants made both series of choices once for themselves 
and once on behalf of a stranger. They were told to imagine that they were making decisions 
for another participant in the experiment. Half of the participants were in the small magnitude 
condition where the amounts to win or lose varied from £5 to £100. The other half were in the 
large magnitude condition where the amounts to win or lose vary from £50,000 to £1,000,000. 
Participants completed the task four times (self-gain, self-loss, other-gain, other-loss) and were 
always presented with the same outcome magnitude. The order of presentation of each 
condition was randomised. There were 16 trials per condition which were presented in random 
order. All trials were composed of a choice between a risky option and a sure option. The risky 
option was a probability (20%, 40%, 60%, 80%) of winning or losing an amount 
(£25/£250000, £50/£500000, £75/£750000, £100/£1000000). The sure option was the 
expected value of the risky option it is paired with. These are the probabilities used in a 
 




commonly used task where the sure option is also of equivalent expected value to the risky 
option (Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). 
 
Results 
We entered the percentage of risky choices participants made in each condition into a 2 
(Recipient) x 2 (Domain) x 2 (Magnitude) mixed model ANOVA (see Figure 1). Participants 
were more risk-taking for someone else (M=33.78 [29.44, 38.11]) than for themselves 
(M=29.19 [25.74, 32.65]) (F1,118=5.685, p=.019, p2=0.046). They were more risk-taking over 
losses (M=38.51 [33.69, 43.33]) than over gains (M=24.46 [20.55, 28.37]) (F1,118=25.756, 
p<.001, p2=0.179). This was qualified by an interaction where participants took more risk for 
others in a gain frame (t119=-3.850, p<.001, d=0.35) but not in a loss frame (t119=0.068, p=.946, 
d=0.01) (F1,118=12.464, p=.001, p2=0.096). We did not find a main effect of magnitude 
(F1,118=3.25, p=.074, p2=0.03) or an interaction between magnitude and recipient 
(F1,118=2.43, p=.122, p2=0.02) and between frame and magnitude (F1,118=3.65, p=.059, 
p2=0.03). Crucially, we did not find a three-way interaction between recipient, frame and 





Figure 1: Percentage of risky choices participants made in each condition in Experiment 1. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05. 
 
Discussion 
As is the case in previous studies, we find that self-other differences vary by frame. In 
this instance, people are more risk-taking for others in a gain frame but not in a loss frame, 
where levels of risk-taking are comparable. Contrary to expectations, we do not find that self-
other differences vary by outcome magnitude, which suggests that decisions for others over 
large magnitudes are not comparable in the economic and medical domains. However, we used 
hypothetical outcomes here which could have not been particularly salient or meaningful to 
participants. In fact, the large magnitude condition featured outcomes which were particularly 
large and perhaps unrealistically so for most participants.  
In Experiment 2, we remedy this by using large magnitudes which people commonly 
encounter, with the addition of a financial incentive. Although a meta-analysis of self-other 
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worth using them here for several reasons. Incentives improve performance in judgment tasks 
by increasing effort (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999), which could be significant here if participants 
make judgments about the other person’s preferences when deciding on their behalf (Batteux 
et al., 2019b). Although incentives generally do not affect mean performance in gambling 
tasks, they can increase risk-aversion (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Holt & Laury, 2002). 
Crucially, financial incentives reduce error variance, meaning that small effects are more likely 
to be identified (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Smith & Walker, 1993). Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that incentives may not have an effect when participants are driven by intrinsic 
motivation, i.e. driven by the reward provided by the task itself (Lee, 2007). Finally, given the 
possibility that Experiment 1 was underpowered to detect small interactions between recipient 




Design. The design was identical to Experiment 1. 
Participants. Participants (n=276) residing in the UK were recruited via Prolific to detect 
a small effect size (d=0.20) with acceptable power (b=0.80) and alpha level (a<.05). The age 
group ranged from 18 to 85 (M=34.65, SD=12.54). There were 91 males and 184 females with 
varying levels of education. 
Choice task. The task was identical to Experiment 1, except for the amounts of money.  
Half of the participants were in the small magnitude condition where the amounts to win or 
lose varied from £0.50 to £10. The other half were in the large magnitude condition where the 
amounts to win or lose vary from £2.50 to £50. The risky option was a probability (20%, 40%, 
60%, 80%) of winning or losing an amount (£2.50/£12.50, £5/£25, £7.50/£37.50, £10/£50). 
The sure option was the expected value of the risky option it is paired with. Choices were 
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incentivised by a bonus payment, which could be between £0 and £15. Participants were told 
the amount would be determined by the choices they make for themselves and the choices 
another participant in the experiment makes for them, who they were paired with. There were 
told that in each block (self-gain, self-loss, other-gain, other-loss) there was one real choice 
which would affect theirs or the other participant’s bonus payment depending on who the 
choice was for, but they won’t know which specific choice it would be. The real one was, in 
the small magnitude condition, the choice between +/-£0.50 and a 20% chance of +/-£2.50 and 
in the large magnitude condition the choice between winning or losing +/-£2.50 and a 20% 
chance of +/-£12.50. This means that participants make a real decision for someone else, which 
is likely to increase the feeling of responsibility compared to Experiment 1. Each participant 
was paired with a participant from the other condition so that each bonus payment was made 
up of one gain and one loss choice in the small magnitude condition and one gain and one loss 
choice in the large magnitude condition. This ensured participants received equivalent bonus 
payments irrespective of which condition they were randomly assigned to. Some participants 
ended up with a negative bonus payment, in which case they did not receive a bonus payment 
rather than losing money. 
 
Results 
We entered the percentage of risky choices participants made in each condition into a 2 
(Recipient) x 2 (Domain) x 2 (Magnitude) mixed model ANOVA (see Figure 2). As in 
Experiment 1, participants were more risk-taking over losses (M=41.18 [38, 44.38]) than over 
gains (M=33.13 [30.30, 35.95]) (F1,276=13.99, p<.001, p2=0.05) which was qualified by an 
interaction with recipient where participants took more risk for others in a gain frame (t119=-
3.72, p<.001, d=0.22) but not in a loss frame (t119=0.99, p=.324, d=0.06) (F1,276=9.98, p=.002, 
p2=0.03). Participants were overall more risk-taking for someone else but the main effect of 
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recipient was not statistically significant (F1,276=2.87, p=.091, p2=0.01). We did not find a 
main effect of magnitude (F1,276=0.46, p=.498, p2<0.01), although there was an interaction 
between magnitude and recipient (F1,276=6.37, p=.012, p2=0.02). Participants were more risk-
seeking for others in the large magnitude condition (t138=-2.96, p=.004, d=0.25) but not the 
small magnitude condition (t138=0.60, p=.555, d=0.05). However, we did not find a three-way 
interaction between recipient, frame and magnitude (F1,276=0.10, p=.753, p2<0.01).  
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of risky choices participants made in each condition in Experiment 2. 
Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05. 
 
To provide an overview of our findings Experiments 1 and 2, we assess which effects 
hold when both experiments are analysed together. Participants were more risk-taking for 
someone else (F1,394=10.43, p=.001, p2=0.03). This was qualified by an interaction with frame 
(F1,394=20.57, p<.001, p2=0.05), where participants were more risk-taking for others over 
gains (t397=-5.30, p<.001, d=0.27) but not losses (t397=0.86, p=.393, d=0.05). The effect of 
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where participants were more risk-taking for others over large magnitudes (t397=-3.89, p<.001, 
d=0.27) but not small magnitudes (t397=0.05, p=.958, d<0.01). Participants were more risk-
taking over losses than over gains (F1,394=34.71, p<.001, p2=0.08) and there was no 
significant main effect of magnitude (F1,394=3.71, p=.055, p2=0.01). There were no significant 
interactions between frame and magnitude (F1,394=3.42, p=.065, p2=0.01) or between 
recipient, frame and magnitude (F1,394=0.40, p=.529, p2<0.01). 
These effects do not seem to differ by experiment. Indeed, there were no significant 
interactions between recipient and experiment (F1,394=2.41, p=.122, p2=0.01), frame and 
experiment (F1,394=2.55, p=.111, p2=0.01), recipient, magnitude and experiment (F1,394=0.10, 
p=.755, p2<0.01), frame, magnitude and experiment (F1,394=0.94, p=.333, p2<0.01), 
recipient, frame and experiment (F1,394=0.95, p=.331, p2<0.01), and recipient, frame, 
magnitude and experiment (F1,394=0.97, p=.325, p2<0.01). However, participants were more 
risk-taking in Experiment 2 (F1,394=8.01, p=.005, p2=0.02). This seems to go against the 
finding that incentives reduce risk-taking (Holt & Laury, 2002), although could be explained 
by the gambles involving much smaller amounts in Experiment 2. With very large amounts, 
people might be more satisfied with the safe gain and particularly avoid the risky loss.   
 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, we find that self-other differences vary by frame, with decisions for 
others being more risk-taking in a gain frame but not in a loss frame. This time, we find that 
self-other differences are present in the large magnitude condition rather than the small 
magnitude condition, which we also find when analysing both experiments together. It could 
be that we failed to find an interaction between magnitude and recipient in Experiment 1 
because the study was underpowered. Indeed, we found an equivalent effect size for the 
interaction between recipient and magnitude in both experiments (p2=0.02), as also shown by 
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the joint analysis. This suggests that self-other differences are present with large magnitudes 




Our aim was two-fold. Our first aim was to examine whether the significance of the 
decision affects financial risk-taking for others. We find evidence that outcome magnitude 
affects self-other differences when choices are incentivised. People seem more willing to take 
risks for someone else than they would for themselves in situations where larger amounts of 
money are at stake. This suggests that the mechanisms which lead to self-other differences are 
at play when outcomes are more significant. When outcomes are less significant, people seem 
to make similar decisions for others than for themselves. This could signal that they are more 
inclined to rely on a projected perspective (i.e. what they would do for themselves), perhaps 
because they put less effort into the decision, as expected by Tunney and Ziegler’s model of 
surrogate decision-making (2015). 
Our second aim was to test whether the cautious shift account applies to significant 
financial decisions, as in medical decisions (Batteux et al., 2019b). This does not seem to be 
the case. If anything, caution was decreased for others relative to the self in decisions of high 
significance. This means that diverging effects in both domains cannot be explained by 
outcome magnitude alone. Economic and medical surrogate decisions are not directly 
comparable – context matters. We cannot yet speak of self-other differences as if they were 
interchangeable between domains. This is consistent with Tunney and Ziegler’s (2015) model 
of surrogate decision-making insofar as the specific features of the decision matter and should 
be accounted for in theories of surrogate decision-making. In contrast, accounts such as the 
cautious shift are far more context-dependent and have less explanatory power. 
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It is difficult to say whether our findings support the risk-as-feelings account. People 
were more inclined to choose risky options for others than for themselves, which suggests they 
are more risk-taking for others. We find this to be the case for larger outcomes, which could 
be because the risk is more significant and therefore elicits stronger emotional reactions. Given 
that people were risk-averse for themselves, our findings suggest they are more risk-neutral for 
others, which is support for the risk-as-feelings account. From an economic perspective, this 
could be interpreted as decisions for others being more optimal. An optimal decision-maker 
would be indifferent between the risky and sure option in our study as they both have the same 
expected value. People show more indifference for others and could therefore be considered to 
be more optimal, which there is a precedent for in risky choice (Batteux et al., 2017), 
intertemporal choice (Ziegler & Tunney, 2012) and information search (Liu, Polman, Liu, & 
Jiao, 2018). Similarly to the risk-as-feelings account, this has been explained by the presence 
of an empathy gap (Loewenstein, 1996), whereby people are emotionally removed from the 
outcome of the decision in a surrogate context. This means they are less susceptible to 
emotional influences on their decision-making, which would for instance reduce framing 
effects (Nabi et al., 2020). Alternatively, being more indifferent between risky and sure options 
could be interpreted as people behaving more randomly for others. This seems less plausible 
given the theoretical and empirical support for other interpretations, but worth keeping in mind 
for this particular study. Teasing apart these alternative explanations in future research would 
be useful.  
We did not find evidence of self-other differences over losses. This contrasts previous 
findings showing that risk-seeking is reduced for others over losses (Batteux et al., 2019a). 
However, in our experiments people’s decisions over losses were actually risk-averse. This is 
unusual for risky choice findings, although not unprecedented in studies which like ours still 
find a clear framing effect (e.g. Aczel, Szollosi, & Bago, 2018). According to the risk-as-
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feelings hypothesis, this would not lead to reduced risk-taking for others given that people’s 
own risk preferences were not risk-seeking. In fact, it should increase risk-taking, as we found 
over gains. This is evidence against the account that people are more risk-neutral or more 
optimal for others. There seems to be something else about the gain domain which leads to 
increased risk-taking for others in our study. It could be that people are making decisions based 
on their perception of the other’s preferences, as has been shown (Batteux et al., 2019b). 
Indeed, people expect others to be less risk-averse than them over gains (Faro & Rottenstreich, 
2006; Hsee & Weber, 1997). Over losses, people expect others to be less risk-seeking, although 
this is the case if they themselves are risk-seeking. If people are risk-averse over losses perhaps 
they expect others to be as well and to the same degree, which could explain our findings and 
be explored in further research.  
It is possible that if people here had been risk-seeking over losses they would have 
reduced their risk-taking for others, as has been found in previous studies (Sun et al., 2016; 
Zhang et al., 2017; Ziegler & Tunney, 2015). Although it is not clear whether our findings in 
the loss domain would hold when people are particularly risk-seeking for themselves, they are 
decisive on the fact that we do not see a clear reduction in risk-taking for others, including over 
larger magnitudes which stands in contrast to findings in the medical literature. For a clearer 
comparison we would need to check this is the case with mixed gambles, although we are likely 
to obtain the same findings given that there do not seem to be self-other differences over mixed 
gambles in the financial domain (Batteux et al., 2019a). 
Why might we see a cautious shift in medical but not financial decisions? Economic and 
medical decisions seem to elicit different decision processes, where the former is focused on 
probabilities and the latter on outcomes (Pachur, Hertwig, & Wolkewitz, 2014; Popovic, 
Pachur, & Gaissmaier, 2019). Moreover, increased risk-taking for others in financial decisions 
and decreased risk-taking in medical decisions is the pattern that manifests itself in the field, 
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which could have affected decision-makers in our study. Financial agents have been accused 
of excessive risk-taking with other people’s money (Wengström, Andersson, Holm, & Tyran, 
2013), whereas medical professionals have been pointed out to be more conservative when 
treating patients (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012). Interestingly, there seems to be an 
absence of accountability held against financial decision-makers when things go wrong 
(Koudijs, Salisbury & Sran, 2018), a contrast to the rise in litigations against medical 
professionals which seem to explain their conservative choices (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 
2012). If financial decision-makers were similarly held accountable for their decisions, perhaps 
a cautious shift would be observed. This supports theoretical accounts which highlight that 
accountability (Tunney & Ziegler, 2015) and social values (Stone & Allgaier, 2008) are 
important when making decisions for others, perhaps more than when deciding for oneself. 
Our finding that people are more risk-taking for others over large amounts echoes the 
concern raised in the aftermath of the financial crisis that agents acting on behalf of investors 
are prone to higher risk-taking because they are removed from the outcome of their decisions. 
However, the effect here was small and there are undoubtedly more factors at play in investors’ 
decision-making. Nonetheless, it is worth checking whether the effect persists in situations 
which are more representative of these decisions. Testing whether this also applies when 
decisions involve gains with the prospect of a loss, when they are made on behalf of a group 
and when they are made by financial agents themselves would all strengthen our understanding 
of real financial risk-taking. Field studies which further increase the significance of decisions 
would also be valuable to understanding how the feeling of responsibility manifests itself in 
financial decisions for others. 
To conclude, this study has contributed to closing the gap concerning the effect of 
outcome magnitude in financial surrogate decisions, while shedding some new light on domain 
differences. Future work should further explore the effects of other decision features to refine 
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theoretical accounts of surrogate decision-making. This will also lead to a better understanding 
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